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per cent werenonrnernbers. (4) The relatively fe'; iarge member banks
that failed at the end of 1930 were reerJedby many Reserve officials
as unfortunate cases0!':.management and therefore not subject to
correction by cmtral bank action.1
1'September 1931, when Governor Harrison convened a meeting of
commercial bankers to discuss means of making deposits in closed banks
available, he recalled that "at one time it was the feeling of many of us
down town that the effects of the failure of- small banks in the com-
munity could be isolated," but "it was clear that the continued cicsing
of institutiOflS in the cityis now having senmuus repercussions
4. International Character of the Contraction
In 1929, most countries of the 'Nesternworld had returned to a monetary
standard involving fixed exchange rates between different national cur-
rencies. The standard was widely known as the gold-exchangestandard be-
cause many countries kept their monetary reservesin the form of balances
of other currencies convertible into gold atfixed prices, notably sterling
and dollars, rather than in the form of golditself. Official aeencies in
such countries, usually the central banks,often fixed exchange rates
directly by standing ready to buy or sell the national currency atfixed
rates in ternis of othercurrencies, rather than indirectly by standing ready
to buy or sell gold at Fixed pncesin terms ot the national currency.
Since the gold-exchange standard, like the goldstandard, involved
fixed exchange rates, it also nseant that, so long as thestandard was
maintained, prices and incorns in different countries were intimately
connected. They had to behave so as to preserve a roughequilibrium in
the balance of payments among the countries.The use of the gold-ex-
change standard did mean, however, thatthere was less leeway in the
adjustments among countniesthe roughequilibrium could not be quite
so rough as under thefull gold standard. Theold-exchange standard
rendered the international financial system morevulnerable to disturb-
ances for the sante reasonthat the risein the deposit-reserve ratio
rendered the domestic monetary systemmore vulnerable: becauseit
raised the ratio of claimmis on the relevanthigh-powered moneyin this
case, ulttmateiy, goldtothe amount of high-powered money available
to meet those claims.
The links forged by the fixed rates of exchangeensured a worldwide de-
cline in income and prices after 1929.just as the links forged by the
less rigidly fixed exchange rates in 1920ensured a worldwide decline
then. No major contraction involving asubstantial fall in prices could
develop in an' one country without thoselinks enforcing itstrans-
" We are indebted to Clark Warburton for thisparagraph
"Harrison, Office, Vol. 11, Sept. 11, 1931.
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mission and spreadto other countries- Therewas sufficientP1Y tO tL iinks to permitminor uncoordinatedmovements bitt notto permitmau ones.
As in 1920, the worldwidescope of the contractiononcet got uridet way does not mean that itdid not originatein the United Satcs.E\Tr since World War Iat the latest, the UnitedStates has beena sttffidentiv important participant inworld trade and inworld capitaland financial markets and has helda sufficiently largefraction ofthe ssorld gold stock to becapable of initiatingworldwidemovements andnot merely of reactingto them. Of course, ifit did initiatea worldwide dis- turbance,it would inevitablybe affected inturn brt'dex influenus from the rest of theworld.
We saw in Chapter5 that there isgood reasonto regard the1920-21 contraction as havingbeen initiatedprimarily in theUnited StatesThe initial stepthe sharprise in discountrates in January 1
92O----was indeed a consequence of theprior gold outflow,but thatus turn reflectedthe United Statesinflation in 1919.The rise indiscount ratesproduceda reversal of the goldmovement in May.The secondstepthe rise in discount rates in June1920 to the highestlevel in Federal
Reserve history before or sincewasa deliberate act ofpolicy involvinga reaction stronger than was needed,since a goldinflow had alreadybegun. Itwas succeeded bya heavy gold int'low,proof positivethat the othercountries were being forced to adaptto United Statesaction in orderto check their loss of gold. ratherthan thereverse.
The situation in1929 wasnot dissimilar.Again, theinitialcli- mactic eventthestock marketcrashoccurred inthe UnitedStates. The series ofdevclopments whichstarted the stockof r000e\'on its ac- celerated downwardcourse in late 1930was again
predominantly do- mestic in origin.It would bedifficult indeedto attribute thesequence of bank failuresto any majorcurrent influencefrom abroad.And again,the clinching evidencethat the UnitedStates was inthe van ofthe movement and not a followeris the flowof gold. Ifdeclines elsewherewere being transmitted to theUnited States,the transmission
mechanism wouldbe a balance ofpayments deficit inthe UnitedStates asa result ofa decline in prices andincomes elsewhererelative toprices andinconis's in the United States.That declinewould leadto a coldoutflow fromth United States which,in turn, wouldtndif theUnited Statesoliowed eold-standard riiles-----tolower the stockof moneyand therebyincome and prices in the United
Statcs However,the US.gold stockrose during
the first twoyears of thecontraction anddid notdecline,demonstrating




































not only because the gold-exchange standard had rendered the inter-
national financial system more vulnerable to disturbances, but also because
the United States did not follow gold-standard rules. We did not permit
the inflow of gold to expand the U.S money stock. We not only sterilized
it, we went much further. Our money stock moved perversely, going
down as the gold stock went up. In August 1929, our money stock was
10.6 times our gold stock; by August 131, it was 8.3 tunes the gold
stock. The result was that other countries not only had to bear the whole
burden of adjustment but also were laced with continued additional dis-
turbances in the same direction, to which they had to adjust. As Harrison
noted in early 1931, foreign commentators were particularly critical of the
monetary policy of the United States because
the gold as it came into the country has been used by member banks to repay
Federal reserve credit in one form or another, with the result that in this period
the total volume of Federal reserve credit had declined by an amount equal
to the gold imports. Thus it may be said that the United States has prevented
the usual or normal effect of gold which has come to it.... The evils to the
world of conunued gold sterilization...are so great as to make desirable
a careful scrur.iny of Federal reserve open market policy."
The effects first became severe in those countries that had returned
to gold with the smallest actual gold reserves, and whose financial struc-
tures had been most seriously weakened by World War IAustria,
Germany, Hungary, and Rumania. To shore up the financial systems of
those counLics, international loans, in which the Reserve System partici-
pated, were arranged. But so long as either the basic pressure on those
countries deriving from deflation in the United States was not relieve& OF
the fixed exchange-rate link which bound them to the U.S. dollar was not
severed, such assistance was at best a temporary palliative. In country
alter country, that is what it proved to be. As they experienced financial
difficulties, the United States, as we have seen, was in turn affected by
the reflex influence of the events it had set in train.
The key role of fixed exchange rates in the international transmission
mechanism is cogently illustrated by the case of China. China was on a
silver rather than a gold standard. As a result, it had the equivalent
of a floating exchange rate with respect to gold.standard countries. A
decline in the gold price of silver had the same effect as a depreciation
in the foreign exchange value of the Chinese yuan. The effectas to in-
sulate Chinese internal economic conditions from the worldwide depres-
sion. As world prices fell in terms of gold, so did the gold price of silver.
Hence the prices of goods in terms of silver could remain approxunately
the same. China could continue so maintain external balance without
undergoing an internal deflation. And that is what happened. From 1929
Harrison Open Market, Vol. 11, Apr. 27, 1931.
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to 1931, China was hardly affected internally by the holocaustthat wa.
s%eeping the gold-standard world,Tjust as inl920-21, Germans' had
been insulated byher hvperinfiation and associated floatingrxchan
rate."
The first major country to Cut the linkwas Britain, when she left tL
gold standard in 1931. The trough of the depressionin Britain and in
other countries that accompanied Britain in leavinggold was reached
in the third quarter of 1932. In the countriesthat remained on tile gold
standard or,like Canada, that went onlypart way with Britain, the
depression dragged on. In China, whosecurrency appreciated relative to
the pound as a result of the sharp depreciationof tile pound relativeto
gold. the depression set in for die first timein 1931.
Of course, the country in tile vanguardof such an internationalmove-
rnent need not stay there. France, which hadaccumulatec, s laree stock of
gold as a result of returning to the goldstandard in 1928 at .' exchange
rate that undervalued the franc, and thereforehad much leeway, atsome
point passed the United States and not only beganto add to its gold stock
but also, after late 1931, to draingold from the United States Thelink between the franc and the dollarwas cut when the United Statessus- pended gold pa)ments in March 1933,which proved to be the business
cycle trough for the United Statesand countries closely linkedto itIn France. which stayed on gold fora further interval, the contractioi1
(Iragged on still longer. Althoughthere was an upturn from July1932 to July 1933, the low point of theinterwar years was not reacheduntil April 1935.
5. Development ofMonetary Policy
The course of monetary policyin the difficult and criticals'ears of the contraction was greatly influencedby the struggle forpower within tile Federal Reserve S'.tem, thebeginnings of whichwere described in the preceding chapter. At the timeof the stock marketcrash, the New York Reserve Bank acted in thetradition of its earlierdominancer11ovifl" rapidly, decisively, andon its own. The adversereaction of the Board greatly inhibited furtherindependent measures b.New York In 1930. New York stronglyfavored expansio!sarVopen markct opria. tions, but after the middleof the'car was unable to persuadeeither ti:' other Bank governors_allof whom by thi5 timehad become members of the reorganizyd Open MarketPolicy Conferencewhich replaced die earlier Open Market InvestmentCommittee..or theBoard in Wash- ington. The samewas true in1931, except thatNew Yorkwas less 'Arthur Salter, China andSilver, New York,Economic Forum 1934pp 3-6 15-1?.
Frank D. Graham, ExchangePrices, and Prdu.-'inn/i psr:?,'i, Gerrr.any, 1920-23. PrincetonUnivcrsjr. Precs, 1931,2873g